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1. Introduction 
In the Information Technology Communication Society, the information system in any 
organization is always exposed to various kinds of risks, and they should prepare 
countermeasures against possible risks to protect their assets and secure their activities' 
continuity. For that purpose, several types of information risk evaluation and management 
systems, such as ISO/IEC 27002, MEHARIT, MAGERIT, SP800-30, OCTAVESM, etc., are 
proposed by institutions all over the world. Although each system has its own policy and 
characteristic, on the final stage after the risk evaluation was done and some serious risks 
were clarified, the system usually goes on the process of choosing effective and available 
mitigation controls against each of risks.  
In our prior works, we proposed a method to choose a set of effective elements from a given 
database of properly valued mitigation controls and we also proposed a method of 
clustering these controls related to the threat path of OCTAVE’s risk profile worksheet.  
However we have not yet constructed any feasible database system for practical use, now 
the effort is in progress. For that sake, it is necessary to investigate several existent systems 
of mitigation controls, and to compare and analyse them.  
The content of the chapter is as follows: 
1. Overview and investigation of existent information risk management systems and their 
mitigation controls 
2. Brief explanation of useful tools for the proposed total system of risk management, such 
as fuzzy outranking, fuzzy inference mechanism, modified structural modelling 
method, and c-mean clustering. 
3. Review of our proposed method for choosing effective set of mitigation controls from a 
well-defined database of controls 
4. Details of the process constructing database systems 
5. Discussion and conclusion  
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2. Overview and investigation of existent information risk management 
systems and their mitigation controls 
Throughout this chapter, we define a risk mitigation control to be a measure which could 
reduce the current or potential risk degree. However the risk degree is evaluated in various 
aspects and from different point of views, and each mitigation control has its own property, 
characteristic, and merit, the total process of risk mitigation can be summarized in several 
similar steps. In this section, we will see some risk evaluation and management 
methodologies.  
2.1 Hand book of information security 
According to D. Kaye, risk mitigation is a process aimed at limiting the likelihood of risks 
and the potential losses those risks can cause (Kaye, 2002, p.100).  
The following step summarization is from the Hand Book of Information Security (Bidgoli, 
2006, p.750). 
 Avoid the causes 
Risks are caused by many types of instances. If the risk is technological, we can avoid the 
risk by updating or replacing the related system by more robust and reliable one.  
 Reduce the frequency 
Risk is usually assessed by the frequency it occurs and the impact it may cause. By adopting 
a control which mainly reduces the occurrence frequency of the risk, the risk can be 
mitigated.  
 Minimize the impact 
Since the frequency of the risk can not be reduced to zero, we should consider the impact of 
the risk to the organization's activities as the other important factor of risk. The impact 
related to a risk has various aspects depending on the organization under mind, and try to 
minimize the impact not only from each aspects but also from the total point of view. 
 Reduce the duration 
The duration of the exposure to a risk may cause more serious risks. The recovery time of 
data or system, for instance, is important matter. 
The risks are usually evaluated as the pair of two factors such as the frequency and the 
impact, then the second and the third steps are usual steps for risk evaluation. The cause 
avoidance and the duration reduction are sometimes treated as concrete measures of 
mitigation controls. 
In the book, the risk transfer, such as insurance or outsourcing, is dealt as the different step 
from the risk mitigation. 
2.2 OCTAVE-S 
SEI (Software Engineering Institute) of Carnegie Melon University developed OCTAVESM 
(Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation System) (Alberts & 
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Dorofee, 2003) as a security evaluation system based on organizational assets. OCTAVE-S is 
a variation of the approach tailored to relatively small organizations (less than 100 people) 
which have the limited means and unique constraints.  
In the implementation guide (Alberts et al., 2005), the key differences between OCTAVE and 
other traditional information risk evaluation and management approaches are described as 
in the table 1. 
Ordinary risk assessment has three important aspects such as operational risk, security risk, 
and technology risk. OCTAVE developers say that other evaluation systems are tend to 
evaluate the organizational systems and to focus on the technology. In OCTAVE, the 
technology is examined as the part of security practice, and other two aspects mainly drive 
OCTAVE approach. 
 
OCTAVE Other Evaluation systems 
Organization evaluation System evaluation 
Focus on security practices Focus on technology 
Strategic issues Tactical issues 
Self direction Expert led 
Table 1. The key Differences 
OCTAVE aims to evaluate the organization itself in aspect of information assets, threats and 
vulnerabilities, and focus on their practices to obtain the information security, which 
eventually lead the organization to strategic protection issues rather than tactical ones. The 
expert led system is managed by a team of experts in risk analysis, or in information 
technologies from outside or inside. OCTAVE is self-directed system lead by a small 
interdisciplinary team, called the analysis team, consist of members in the organization.  
OCTAVE(-S) has three phases in each of which the analysis team outputs the corresponding 
matters as follows. 
Phase1. Build Asset-Based Threat Profiles 
Outputs: Critical assets, security requirements for critical assets, threats to critical assets, and 
current security practices 
Phase2. Identify Infrastructure Vulnerabilities 
Outputs: Key components and current technology vulnerabilities 
Phase3. Develop Security Strategy and Plans 
Outputs: Risks to critical asset, risk measures, protection strategy, and risk mitigation plans 
Each phase has some process consist of several steps, which we show in the table2 from the 
guide (Alberts et al., 2005). 
In the series of our research project, we first proposed a method to identify the set of critical 
assets from huge number of possible information related assets in correspondence of the 
step S2.1 in the table (Nagata et al., 2007). In the method we used FSM (Fuzzy Structural 
Modelling) based the modified structural modelling method described in the following 
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section. Next we proposed a risk evaluation system for a chosen critical asset with fuzzy 
inference mechanism corresponding to the process S4 (Nagata, et al., 2008B). 
One of important roles of any risk management system is to develop a mitigation plan in 
which effective and proper mitigation controls are set up. For this purpose, a method to 
select effective risk mitigation controls is proposed using fuzzy outranking in 
correspondence of the process S5 (Nagata, et al., 2009). This method works under the 
assumption that there is a database of mitigation controls with some kind of vector whose 
entries are numerical values assigned to the attributes in OCTAVE’s threat path. We also 
proposed a method for constructing that kind of database (Nagata, 2011).  
 
Phase Process Group of Steps 
Phase1 
S1: 
Identify Organizational 
Information 
S1.1:Establish impact evaluation criteria 
S1.2: Identify organizational assets 
S1.3: Evaluate organizational security practices 
S2: 
Create Threat Profiles 
S2.1: Select Critical Assets 
S2.2: Identify security requirements for critical 
assets 
S2.3: Identify threats to critical assets 
Phase2 
S3: 
Examine the Computing 
infrastructure in Relation to 
Critical Assets 
S3.1: Examine access path 
S3.2: Analyze technology-related process 
Phase3 
S4: 
Identify and Analyse Risks 
S4.1: Evaluate impact of threats 
S4.2: Establish probability evaluation criteria 
S4.3: Evaluate probabilities of threats 
S5: 
Develop Protection Strategy 
and Mitigation Plans 
S5.1: Describe current protection strategy 
S5.2: Select mitigation approaches 
S5.3: Develop risk mitigation plans 
S5.4: Identify changes to protection strategy 
S5.5: Identify next steps 
Table 2. Phase, Process, and Group of Steps in OCTAVE-S 
When proceeding in risk evaluation steps, the risk profile worksheet plays a big role in 
order to recognize the information related threat, and to evaluate the impact and the 
frequency the threat may cause. 
In the worksheet shown in Fig. 1, threats are classified into three types such as “Human 
actors”, “System problems”, and “Other problems” in the first place. For the human actors 
causing threats, the access path (network or physical), actors (inside or outside), motive 
(accidental or deliberate), and outcome (disclosure or modification or loss and destruction 
or interruption) are examined in this order. For the System problems causing threats, actors 
(software defects or system crashes or hardware defects or malicious code), and outcome are 
examined. For the “Other problems”, various actors (e.g. problems related to power supply, 
telecommunication, third-party, natural disasters, physical configuration etc.) are examined. 
Each impact area of Reputation, Financial, Productivity, Fines/legal penalties, Safety and 
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Other (facilities) are considered for the non-negligible threats as the result of examination. 
According to the volume 3 of the OCTAVE-S Implementation Guide (Alberts, et al., 2005), 
the three impact measure (High, Medium, or Low) are adopted, and probability values are 
also measured as one of them (H, M, or L) by considering a frequencies such as daily, 
weekly, monthly, 4 times per year, 2 times per year, once per year, once very 2 years, and so 
on. Fig1 is an example of the risk profile worksheet for the Human Actors Using Network 
Access.  
At first, put one of critical assets in the left-hand side box, and trace the dotted line 
considering the possibility of access, actor, motive, and outcome. Then, for each threat on 
the possible path, the impact values related to given subjects and the probability value are 
determined with confidence level. 
 
(source: the Volume 5 of OCTAVE-S Implementation Guide, Version1) 
Fig. 1. Risk profile worksheet for human actors with network access 
We use the worksheet, but we adopt much more numerical evaluation method without loss 
of human related, consensus based, and organizational strategic concept. Our proposed total 
Asset Access Actor Outcome 
network 
inside 
outside 
accidental 
deliberate 
deliberate 
accidental 
disclosure 
 modification 
loss,destruction 
interruption 
Motive 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
Pr
o
du
ct
iv
e 
Fi
ne
s 
Sa
fe
ty
 
O
th
er
 
Probability 
R
ep
ut
at
io
n 
Impact Values 
Value Confidence 
Threat 
V
er
y 
So
m
ew
ha
t 
N
ot
 A
t A
ll 
www.intechopen.com
 Security Enhanced Applications for Information Systems 
 
116 
system for evaluation of threat is based on Modified Structural Modeling Method (MSMM), 
fuzzy integral, and fuzzy inference mechanism. In our system, the input values for impact 
values and for probability which should be marked in the box or on the scale bar as 
linguistic values in the OCTAVE are all numerical crisp values between 0 and 1, and the 
human related, consensus based, and organizational strategic concept are mounted and 
integrated with them in the process of fuzzification.  
In the final process, selection of mitigation plans comes up, and listed up in the OCTAVE's 
catalogue of practices (Alberts & Dorofee, 2003, pp. 443—454). 
The followings are classified groups of them.  
 Strategic Practices (SP) 
- Security awareness and training (SP1) 
- Security strategy (SP2) 
- Security management (SP3) 
- Security policies and regulations (SP4) 
- Collaborative security management (SP5) 
- Contingency planning/disaster recovery (SP6) 
 Operational Practices (OP) 
- Physical security (OP1): “Physical security plans and procedures (OP1.1)”, 
“Physical access control (OP1.2)”, “Monitoring and auditing physical security 
(OP1.3)” 
- Information technology security (OP2): “System and network management 
(OP2.1)”, “System administration (OP2.2)”, “Monitoring and auditing IT security 
(OP2.3)”, “Authentication and authorization (OP2.4)”, “Vulnerability management 
(OP2.5)”, “Encryption (OP2.6)”, “Security architecture and design (OP2.7)” 
- Staff security (OP3): “Incident management (OP3.1)”, “General staff practice 
(OP3.2)” 
In each subcategories listed above, there are several controls. For instance, SP1.1 of SP1 is 
“Staff members understand their security roles and responsibilities. This is documented and 
verified”. OP2.1 contains 10 controls, e.g. OP2.1.3 is “Sensitive information is protected by 
secure storage such as…”, OP2.1.4 is “The integrity of installed software is regularly 
refined”, and OP2.1.6 is “There is a documented data backup plan that …”. 
2.3 ENISA 
European Network and Information Security Agency, ENISA, provides risk management 
related documents in one of which risk mitigation is took up as a risk treatment. They define 
the risk treatment as a process of selecting and implementing measures to modify risk, and 
the process is composed of five steps such as, ”Identification of Options”, “Development of 
the Action Plan”, “Approval of the Action Plan”, “Implementation of the Action Plan” and 
“Identification of Residual Risks”.  
ENISA also provides a document named “Information Package for SMEs”, where “SMEs” 
denotes “Small or Medium sized Enterprises”. In the document, the risk management 
process is composed of four phases.  
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Phase1: Select Risk Profiles 
The risk profiling is done using the risk evaluation matrix in which risk areas are specified 
as “Legal and Regulatory”, “Productivity”, “Financial Stability”, and “Reputation and Loss 
of Customer Confidence”. The possible risk levels are “High”, “Medium”, and “Low”, and 
each level is clearly defined according to the risk area. For instance, if the organization’s 
yearly revenue is of excess of 25 million Euros or/and financial transactions with third 
parties or customers are taking place as part of the business as usual process, then the risk 
area of financial stability is “High”. If the yearly revenue exceeds 5 million Euros and not 
exceeds 25 million Euros, then the risk level is “Medium”. Otherwise it is “Low”. After 
identifying the risk levels for all the risk areas, the risk profile of the organization is defined 
as the highest level in the risk evaluation matrix overall the risk areas. 
Phase2: Identify Critical Assets 
In SME, the number of critical assets is fixed as five, and the analysis team choose them 
considering a large adverse impact on the organization caused by “disclosure” or 
“modification” or “loss and destruction” or “interruption” of the asset. These scenarios are 
same as the outcomes in OCTAVE’s risk profile worksheet shown in Figure 1. The assets are 
categorised into “systems”, “network”, “people”, and “applications”, then the rationale and 
security requirement for selecting each critical asset are described. Here the security 
requirements are three ordinary information security aspects, i.e. Confidentiality, Integrity, 
and Availability. 
Phase3: Select Control Cards 
SME adopts OCTAVE’s mitigation controls as their control cards. This phase proceeds in 
three steps such as “Step1: select organization control cards”, “Step2: select asset base 
control cards”, and “Step3: document list of selected controls and rationale”. Here the 
organization control cards correspond to the mitigation controls of strategic practice (SP), 
and the asset base control cards correspond to those of operational practice (OP). The step1 
is performed according to the risk profile in phase 1, and some control cards are selected 
beforehand. For instance, if the risk area “legal and regulatory” is low, then the control SP1.1 
is adopted. The step2 is performed according to the critical asset category, and control card 
consist of security requirements and type of controls is prepared for each asset category and 
risk level. The table below is the list of control cards: 
 
Critical Assets High Risk Cards Medium Risk Cards Low Risk Cards 
Application CC-1A CC-2A CC-3A 
System CC-1S CC-2S CC-3S 
Network CC-1N CC-2N CC-3N 
People CC-1P CC-2P CC-3P 
Table 3. Asset based control selection 
For instance, CC-1A contains OP2.1.3, OP2.1.4, and OP2.1.6 for security requirement of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability respectively as system and network management 
related controls. 
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Phase4: Implementation and Management 
In this phase, the gap between the selected control cards and current security practice is 
analysed at first. Then create risk management plan, and the implementation is done. 
The selection of mitigation controls is discussed both in the Phase3 and in the Phase4, and 
they classify controls into organizational controls shown in annex C, and asset based 
controls shown in annex D.  
2.4 MEHARI 
MEHARI, Method Harmonise d'Analyse de Risque, is developed by CLUSIF, Club de la 
Securite de L'Information Francais, aimed at providing a set of tools specifically designed 
for security management.  
MEHARI uses a word of risk treatment measures or security services for mitigation controls, 
and classifies them into four categories, “Retention”, “Reduction”, “Transfer”, and 
“Avoidance”.  
The standard scales of measures for likelihood reduction or for reduction of frequency 
factors are  
 Efficiency of dissuasion measures 
 Efficiency of prevention measures 
 Efficiency of protective or confinement measures 
 Efficiency of palliative measures 
Each factor has four levels from level1, low or nul, to level4, very high (strong). The list of 
security services has more than 300 of sub-services classified into several service categories 
as follows.  
1. Organization of security: “Roles and structures of security (01A)”, “Security reference 
guide (01B)”, “Human resource management (01C)”, “Insurance (01D)”, “Business 
continuity (01E)” 
2. Sites security: “Physical access control to the site and the building (02A)”, “Protection 
against miscellaneous environmental risks (02B)”, “Control of access to office areas 
(02C)”, “Protection of written information (02D)” 
3. Security of Premises: “General maintenance (03A)”, “Control of access to sensitive 
locations (except office zones) (03B)”, “Security against water damage (03C)”, “Fine 
security (03D)” 
4. Extended Network (intersite): “Security of the extended network architectures and 
service continuity (04A)”, “Control of connections on the extended network (04B)”, 
“Security during data exchange and communication (04C)”, “Control, detection and 
handling of incidents on the extended network (04D)” 
5. Local Area Network (LAN): “Security of the architecture of the LAN (05A)”, “Access 
control of the LAN (05B)”, “Security of data exchange and communication on the LAN 
(05C)”, “Control, detection and resolution of incidents on the LAN (05D)” 
6. Network operations: “Security of operations procedures (06A)”, “Parameters setting 
and control of hardware and software configurations (06B), “Control of administration 
rights (06C)”, “Audit and network control procedures (06D)” 
www.intechopen.com
 Construction of Effective Database System for Information Risk Mitigation 
 
119 
7. Security and architecture of systems: “Control of access to systems (07A)”, 
“Containment of environment (07B)”, “Management and saving of logs (07C)”, 
“Security of the architecture (07D) 
8. IT Protection environment: “Security of operational procedures (08A)”, “Control of 
hardware and software configurations (08B)”, “Management of storage media for data 
and problems (08C)”, “Service continuity (08D)”, “Management and handling of 
incidents (08E)”, “Control of administrative right (08F)”, “Audits and control 
procedures relative to information systems (08G)”, “Management of IT related archives 
(08H)” 
9. Application security: “Application access control (09A)”, “Control of data integrity 
(09B)”, “Control of data confidentiality (09C)”, “Data availability (09D)”, “Service 
continuity (09E)”, “Control of origin and receipt of data (09F)”, “Detection and 
management of application incident and anomalies (09G)”, “Security of the e-
commerce sites (09H)” 
10. Security of application projects and developments: “Security of application projects and 
developments (10A)”, “Ensuring security in the development and maintenance 
processes (10B)” 
11. Protection of users' work equipment: “Security of the operational procedures for the 
whole set of users' equipment (11A)”, “Protection of workstations (11B)”, “Protection of 
data on the workstation (11C)”, “Service continuity of the work environment (11D)”, 
“Control of administrative rights (11E)” 
12. Telecommunications operations: “Security of operational procedures (12A)”, “Control of hardware 
and software configurations (12B)”, “Service continuity (12C)”, “Use of end-user telecommunication 
equipment (12D)”, “Control of administrative rights (12E)” 
13. Management processes: “Protection of personal information (PPI; 13A)”, 
“Communication of financial data (13B)”, “Respect of regulations concerning the 
verification of computerized accounting (VCA; 13C)”, “Protection of Intellectual 
property rights (IPR; 13D)”, “Protection of computerized systems (13E)”, “Human 
safety and protection of the environment (13F)”, “Rules related to the use of 
encryption (13G)” 
14. Information security management: “Establish the management system (14A)”, 
“Implement the management system (14B)”, “Monitor the management system (14C)”, 
“Improve the management system (14D)”, “Documentation (14E)” 
We can see that the same or similar expressions appeared in different categories such as 
“security of operational procedure” is in 06A, 08A, 11A, and 12A, and “service continuity” is 
in 08D, 09E, 11D, and 12C. This suggests the possibility of different perspective for the 
classification of controls. 
MEHARI describes threat by similar items in OCTAVE's risk profile worksheet as shown in 
Fig. 1.  
 Events: ”Accidents”, “Errors”, “Voluntary acts, whether malicious or not”, etc. For each 
of the events, following aspects are described, 
- Whether the cause is internal to the entity, 
- Whether the event is material or immaterial, 
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- Any other factor that may influence the probability of the event occurring. 
 Actors: rights and privileges, 
 Circumstances in which the risk occurs, 
- Process or process steps: modification of files during maintenance operations, 
- Location: theft of media from one location or another, inside or outside the 
organization, 
- Time: actions occurring during or outside working hours. 
A risk scenario is created with the different element, and risk treatment measures effective 
to the scenario are selected.  
2.5 ISO/IEC 
BS7799 part1 based ISO/IEC 27002 defines a security control to be a control which should 
ensure risks are reduced to an acceptable level. The selection of appropriate controls is 
dependent on organizational decisions based on the criteria for risk acceptance and the 
general risk management approach. Thus the acceptance level for the organization should 
be discussed and determined previously.  
The categorization of controls in the document is shown below with corresponding number 
of controls in MEHARIT. 
 Security Policy: “Information security policy (14)” 
 Organization of Information Security(01): “Internal organization”, “External 
organization”  
 Asset Management: “Responsibility for assets (11E)”, “Information classification” 
 Human Resources Security (01C): “Prior to employment”, “During employment”, 
“Termination or changes of employment” 
 Physical and Environmental Security (02): “Secure areas”, “Equipment security (03C)” 
 Communications and Operations Management: “Operational procedures and 
responsibilities (08A)”, “Third party services delivery management”, “System planning 
and acceptance”, “Protection against malicious and mobiles code”, “Bach-up”, 
“Network security management”, “Media handling, Exchange of Information”, 
“Electronic commerce services (09H)”, “Monitoring” 
 Access Control (05B): “Business requirement for access control”, “User access 
management”, “User responsibilities”, “Network system access control (04B)”, 
“Operating system access control”, “Application and information access control”, 
“Mobile computing and tele-working” 
 Information Systems Acquisition, Development and Maintenance: “Security 
requirement”, “Correct processing in application”, “Cryptographic controls (13G)”, 
“Security of system files”, “Security in development and support processes”, “Technical 
vulnerability management” 
 Information Security Incident Management: “Reporting information security events and 
weakness”, “Management of information security incidents and improvement” 
 Business Continuity Management (01E, 01D): “Information security aspects of business 
continuity management” 
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 Compliance: “Compliance with legal requirements (03D, 13A, 13D)”, “Compliance with 
security policies and standards, and technical compliance”, “Information systems 
audits considerations” 
These controls are selected by considering the possible options including:  
 applying appropriate controls to reduce the risk 
 knowingly and objectively accepting risks, providing they clearly satisfy the 
organization's policy and criteria for risk acceptance 
 avoiding risks by not allowing actions that would cause the risks to occur 
 transferring the associated risks to other parties, e.g. insurers or suppliers 
2.6 NIST 
We refer to NIST SP800--30, where the total process of risk mitigation is described in four 
phases such as “risk mitigation options”, “risk mitigation strategy”, “an approach for 
control implementation, control categories, the cost--benefit analysis", and "residual risk".  
The followings are risk mitigation options. 
 Risk Assumption: To accept the potential risk and continue operating the IT system or 
to implement controls to lower the risk to an acceptable level 
 Risk Avoidance: To avoid the risk by eliminating the risk cause and/or consequence 
 Risk Limitation: To limit the risk by implementing controls that minimize the adverse 
impact of a threat's exercising a vulnerability 
 Risk Planning: To manage risk by developing a risk mitigation plan that prioritizes, 
implements, and maintains controls. 
 Research and Acknowledgement: To lower the risk of loss by acknowledging the 
vulnerability or flaw and researching controls to correct the vulnerability 
 Risk Transference: To transfer the risk by using other options to compensate for the 
loss, such as purchasing insurance. 
NIST also provides SP800--53, which includes a list of more than 170 recommended security 
controls for Federal Information Systems.  
The classes of controls and their families are shown as follows. 
 Management Class: “Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments (CA)”, 
“Planning (PL)”, “Risk Assessment (RA)”, “System and Services Acquisition (SA)” 
 Operational Class: “Awareness and Training (AT)”, “Configuration Management 
(CM)”, “Contingency Planning (CP)”, “Incident Response (IR)”, “Maintenance (MA)”, 
“Media Protection (MP)”, “Physical and Environmental Protection (PE)”, “Personnel 
Security (PS)”, “System and Information Integrity (SI)” 
 Technical Class: “Access Control (AC)”, “Audit and Accountability (AU)”, “Identification 
and Authentication (IA)”, “System and Communications Protection (SC)” 
3. Brief explanation of useful tools 
In this section, some tools based on fuzzy theory such as fuzzy outranking method, fuzzy 
inference mechanism, modified structural modelling method based on FSM, and fuzzy c-
mean (clustering) are briefly described. 
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3.1 Fuzzy outranking method 
The method to roughly compare two alternatives a and a' through the adoption of loose 
relation is called outranking. When a is judged not to be inferior to a' at least, it is said that 
a outranks a'. When a' is more preferable than a or they are incomparable to each other, it 
is said that a doesn't outrank a'. While these relations are valued as 0 or 1 in the 
conventional outranking method, such as μ(a,a')=1 if a outranks a' and μ(a,a')=0 if a does 
not outranks a', the fuzzy outranking method access the outranking degree as a value 
between 0 and 1. More precisely, that degree is determined using a fuzzy membership 
function with lower threshold value qi and upper one pi, where “i” represents one of view 
points for evaluating these alternatives. Thus the corresponding value is denoted by 
ci(a,a') (i=1,…,n), and they are aggregated by taking the weighted average 
ω1c1(a,a')+…+ωncn(a, a') with a set of certain weight {ω1,…,ωn}. This index is called the 
“concordance index” denoted by C(a,a'). Another index is “discordance index” denoted by 
dj(a,a'), which is also calculated using a fuzzy set with lower threshold value pj and upper 
one vj. This index represents the degree of objection against the preferability to choose a 
then a'. Thus dj(a,a')=1 implies that the condition “a outranks a'” is exclusively vetoed from 
the number j point of view.  
If there are discordant points of view j1,…, jk, whose index are greater than C(a,a'), then the 
total outranking index μ(a,a') is calculated by the following formula: 
 1
1 ( , ') 1 ( , ')
( , ') ( , ')
1 ( , ') 1 ( , ')
kj j
d a a d a a
a a C a a
C a a C a a
        (1) 
3.2 Fuzzy inference mechanism 
Fuzzy inference (Kaufman, et al., 1975; Klir & Yuan, 1995) is originally the process of 
formulating the mapping from a given input to an output using fuzzy logic. Then the 
mapping provides a basis for which decisions can be made, or patterns distinguished. 
The rule of fuzzy inference is generally expressed as follows: 
“IF x is A1 and y is B1 THEN z is C1, else IF x is A2 and y is B2 THEN z is C2, else IF x is An 
and y is Bn THEN z is Cn , else x is A’ and y is B’ THEN z is C’ “, where A1,…, An, A’ are 
subsets of universe of discourse U, and B1 ,…, Bn, B’ are fuzzy subsets of universe of 
discourse (V; C1 , …, Cn, C’ are fuzzy subsets of universe of discourse W).  
We have several types of fuzzy number such as triangular, trapezoidal, and Gaussian fuzzy 
numbers in mind (Inoue & Amagasa, 1998, pp. 57-66). 
3.3 Modified structural modelling 
The modified structural modelling method is developed by Cui, D. and Amagasa, M. for 
constructing a structural model with consensus of multi-participants (Amagasa, 2004, pp. 
121-132, Nagata et al., 2008A). Here, assume that a decision group consists of several 
members (decision makers) with either equal or different knowledge background for a 
given problem. 
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Let GMk (k=1,...,m) denote group members, and Ak (k=1,...,m) be fuzzy subordination 
matrices of data given by GMk.  
Then, mental model of GMk is embedded into a fuzzy subordination matrix on the 
context on basis of the relaxation of transitivity, reflexivity and symmetry by each group 
member (Zadeh 1965; Klir & Yuan 1995; Tazaki & Amagasa 1979). Herein, NGT and 
automatic generation method of subordination matrix are applied to embed entries of the 
matrices efficiently and effectively. In order to formulate the individual fuzzy 
subordination matrix with the same establishment level, the entries of the matrix 
embedded by group individual are normalized statistically. Then, a representative 
subordination matrix is formulated by integrating the fuzzy subordination matrices of 
group members as follows: 
Let 1{ , ... , , ... , }i nS s s s  denote a system with n elements, and let [ ]kk ij n nA a   (k=1,2,…,m) 
denote the fuzzy subordination matrices in S, where ( , )k kij i ja f s s  (0≤ kija ≤1, i,j=1,2,…,n, 
k=1,2,…,m). kija is the grade of which si is subordinate to sj and m is the number of group 
members. Let 2( , ( ) ) [ ]k k kk k a ij n nNA N a h    (k=1,2,…,m) denote the normalized fuzzy 
subordination matrices calculated by the given data [ ]kk ij n nA a  from group members 
with  
1
( 10 50)
100
k
ij kk
ij k
a
a a
h 
   (i,j=1,…,n, k=1,…,m), where 2
1 1
1 n n k
k ij
i j
a a
n  
   (k=1,…,m) and 
2 2
1 1
1 n nk k
a ij k
i j
a a
n

 
   (k =1, …,m). 
Now, the normalized subordination matrices are used to compute the representative 
subordination matrix which holds the data factor from group members. Let [ ]ijNAR d  
(i,j=1,…,n) be a representative subordination matrix, which is computed by 
1
1 m k
ij ij
k
d h
m 
   (i,j=1,2,…,n). (2) 
Next, the fuzzy reachability matrix is computed on the basis of NAR, and multi-level 
digraph is drawn as an interpretive structural model. In order to compare the structural 
model with mental model, a feedback for learning will be performed to group members. If 
an agreement among group members is obtained, the process goes ahead to documentation 
step. Otherwise, a threshold and fuzzy structure parameter will be modified and the process 
is iterated until a consenting model is derived. Here, let p be the threshold, specified by α-
cut, which is defined by the modified z-value in standard normal distribution. The value of 
p is used for controlling the percentage of subordination relations among elements which 
exist in the structural model to be evaluated. 
Fig. 2 illustrates a flowchart of the modified structural modeling method which begins with 
mental model of individual group member which is determined depending on their 
intuition to the given problem. 
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Fig. 2. The flowchart of modified structural modeling method 
3.4 Fuzzy c-mean clustering 
Data base of multi-attribute elements can be classified into several groups according to a 
fixed metric. This kind of process is call a clustering, and ordinary clustering is simply that 
defining a function, 
: {0,1}d D C     
satisfying the condition that for any x D there is only one c C such that ( , ) 1c x  .  
Here D is the set of all data, C is the set of clusters, and d represents a distance with some 
kind of metric e.g., Euclidean metric, maximum metric, etc. With the function above, each 
element has only one cluster and no overlapping of clusters.  
Fuzzy c-mean clustering is represented by a function, 
: [0,1]d D C     
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Here the value ( , )c x  between 0 and 1 indicates the degree of membership of a data 
x D in a cluster c C , and clusters can be overlapped.  
Now let n be the number of data with n  attributes, and s be a number of clusters, and 
express each data xi=(xi1,...,xin) with values of j-th attribute xij where 1{ ,..., }nD x x .  
When we put the set of all the cluster centers 1{ ,..., }sV v v , the objective function which 
should be minimized is defined as following. 
 
2
1 1
( ; , ) ( , )
s n
m
ij i j
j i
J D U V d x v
 
 ,  (2) 
where { ( , )}ij d j iU c x   satisfying trivial constraints in inequalities 0 1ij   (i=1,...,n, 
j=1,...,s) and only one non-trivial equation 
1
1
s
ijj
  .  
The exponential number m of μ reflects the fuzzyness of the clustering, such as setting m=1 
implies the ordinary, not fuzzy, clustering, increasing the value of m means the widely 
overlapping of the resulted clusters.  
By introducing the Lagrange multiplier λ, objective function is 
 
1
( ; , ) ( ; , ) ( 1)
s
ij
j
W D U V J D U V  

    (3) 
and optimal solutions are given at the saddle points, that is{μij} and vj (j=1,...,s) satisfy 
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 (4) 
where vjk represents the k coordinate of point vj, and the distance function is the Euclidean 
distance 2
1
( , ) ( )
n
i j ik jkk
d x v x v  .  
Solving the equations above, we have 
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 (5) 
Thus the algorithm proceeds in the following steps; 
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1. Load a database D. Determine the number of clusters s, fuzzification value m, and the 
error evaluation threshold ǆ 
2. Set t=1, and give certain initial values for {μij } denoted by {μij (t-1)} 
3. Calculate ( ) ( 1) ( 1)
1 1
/
n nt t t m
ikij ijjk i i
v x     , and put  
 
2
( ) 1
( )
( )
1
( , )
( , )
t ms
i jt
ij t
k i k
d x v
d x v



           
  (6) 
4. With the corresponding values for 1 2( , )mij i jm d x v   , evaluate the difference of two 
values ( ) ( )( ; , )t tW D U V and ( 1) ( 1)( ; , )t tW D U V  by ǆ 
5. If the difference value is less than ǆ, then stop and output ( ){ }tij and ( ){ }tjv as the results 
for U and V. If not, increase t by 1 and go back to the step 3) 
In the algorithm above, we need to be careful that the fuzzification exponent m=1 reduces 
the denominator of the exponent of each terms in Σ for ( )tij to 0.  
Moreover, m is usually set a values between 1.4 and 2.6 (Celikyilmaz, & Turksen, 2009, p.57). 
4. Method for choosing effective set of mitigation controls 
For our proposed method for selecting set of mitigation controls from a database of controls, 
we assume the existence of an external database, D, of mitigation controls with mitigation 
degree,δm (T)∈[0,1] and m∈D, evaluated depending only on the type of threat path T. This 
mitigation degree should signify that adopting the control roughly mitigate the risk level 
from 1 to that degree.  
We use the risk profile work sheet of OCATVE-S, and we suppose that determination of the 
set of critical assets are done, and all the possible threat path were distinguished with the 
risk value calculated from (vR,vF,vP,vFi,vS,vO,p), the vector of impacts and probability. This is 
the preliminary stage of our method.  
Then the process is performed according to the following steps. 
Step 1. Determine a threat path T.  
Step 2. Select several controls as members of the candidate set, M⊂D, by evaluating their 
initial mitigation degree dependent on T. One simple way to determine M is setting 
M={m∈D:ǅm(T)<ǅ} for a definite value ǅ. 
Step 3. Define the desirable, but dummy, mitigation control, a0, as an acceptable impacts 
and probability vector (vR0,vF0,vP0,vFi0,vS0,vO0,p0).  
Step 4. For each element mj∈M, figure out its mitigation degree d*j with respect to each of 
impacts and probability. For instance, dRj represents the reduction degree with 
respect to the impact of reputation when mj is performed. These degrees are 
calculated by considering the type of assets, threat path, and impact or probability 
in some criteria.  
Step 5. Calculate aj= (vRj,vFj,vPj,vFij,vSj,vOj,pj) as the alternative vectors corresponds to mj by 
d*j×v*. 
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Step 6. Apply the fuzzy outranking method with certain threshold values of concordance 
and discordance indices to each of (aj,a0) for j=1,…n, where n is the cardinality of 
M. 
Step 7. Determine the set of effective mitigation controls ET by referring the outranking 
relation values μj=μ(aj,a0). We have two versions for this. One is to determine 
ET={mj;μj >α} as the optimal set with fixed lower boundary value α. The other is to 
choose the definite number of mis’ from the permutated mitigation controls in 
descending order. 
5. Method for construction of effective database system 
Now we propose a method composed of three phases to construct a database system with 
an effective clusters.  
Phase I: Collecting Mitigation Controls 
It seems to be patient and time-consuming works that we gather and examine all controls 
possible to mitigate information related risks, together with giving each of them a kind of 
classification index simultaneously. The classification is used to give each control a value 
vector of OCATVE's threat path attributes related entries in Phase II. Fortunately, we have 
some of existing database of controls referred in section 2 such as in ISO/IEC 27002, 
MEHARI, NIST SP-800, and in OCTAVE. They are already classified in view of various 
aspects.  
Phase II: Evaluation of Controls 
This phase is composed of two processes.  
Process 1: Vector indication in a fixed set 
Fix a set of mitigation controls with some classification. Indicate a vector whose entries are 
values between 0 and 1 corresponding to each of attributes in OCTAVE's threat paths to all 
the controls in the set. Concretely speaking, we have six possible attributes “access“ 
(“network“, “physical“), “actor“ (“inside“, “outside“), “motive“ (“accident“, “deliberate“) 
on the human actors worksheet, and four possible attributes “actor“ (“software defects“, 
“malicious code“, “system crashes“, “hardware defects“) on the system problems 
worksheet. We propose a method to indicate the values for each of attribute by applying the 
MSMM in the following steps, 
Step 1. give a weight each of first level or second level classes 
Step 2. give a weight all the controls in each class 
Step 3. aggregate two weight values in step 1 and step2 
Process 2: Evaluation and modification 
In the previous process, we have controls with value vector according to each classified set. 
The same or similar control can be appear in some classified sets, and it could be possible 
that one control has more than one value vector. We need to identify those controls and 
examine the indicated vectors of each of them before going on the next phase. If the vectors 
corresponding to a control have only acceptable difference, then take a vector whose entries 
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are the average of each entries as the final value vector of the control. If not, go back to the 
value vector indication steps. 
Phase III: Clustering Controls 
Clustering all controls using fuzzy c-mean clustering method by means of attribute vectors. 
Make the correspondence between each of clusters and each of threat paths by looking at the 
center vectors of clusters. Selecting a small set of mitigation controls is performed using this 
correspondence and U defined in subsection 3.4. 
6. Conclusion and discussion 
As the final goal of the series of information security evaluation and management system, 
a system to propose a set of mitigation controls effective and efficient to reduce the 
organizational risk level is very important. For this purpose, the construction of a feasible 
database of mitigation controls is necessary. In this chapter, we look over several types of 
controls, and proposed a method for construct the database. The resulted consists of 
controls with a value vector whose entries are corresponding to some of attributes on the 
threat path in OCTAVE's risk profile worksheet. Our idea to apply the fuzzy c-mean 
clustering might be helpful to choose a small set of control candidates from a huge 
number of controls.  
For the practical use, we need to construct a feasible and real database by applying our 
system and to verify the effectiveness of the total system.  
In our future work, we intend to apply our system to some of classified set of mitigation 
controls, such as in OCTAVE, ENISA, NIST SP800 and in MEHARI, to obtain an example of 
effective database. We also intend to define a function from a set of threat path attributes to 
a set of clusters resulted from fuzzy c-mean clustering.  
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